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The ‘world’s most wanted man,’ Edward Snowden, 
might be one of the most polarizing figures in modern history.  
This is particularly true in the United States, where the debates 
pertaining to his leaks of classified information could not be 
more divided.  Many Americans, including senior level 
government officials, have publicly argued that Snowden is a 
cowardly traitor, and have forcefully stated their belief that 
Snowden should return home to face a myriad of criminal 
charges, including those under the 1917 Espionage Act.   
However, many others have gone to great lengths and taken 
immense personal risks to support Snowden and help further 
his goal of bringing to light some of the most egregious 
surveillance abuses ever released into the public sphere. 
                                                 
1 Dr. Daniel Alati is a post-doctoral researcher at the City University 
of Hong Kong.  His doctoral studies at the University of Oxford 
focused on comparative anti-terrorism mechanisms in Canada and 
the United Kingdom. 
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Snowden’s closest confidants are still eager to tell his story:  
Laura Poitras’ documentary ‘Citizenfour’ has received rave 
reviews2 and long-time NSA critic and journalist James 
Bamford recently interviewed Snowden in Moscow for 
WIRED magazine.3  They continue to release leaked 
documents that expose the greatest abuses of the global 
surveillance machine Glenn Greenwald’s website, The 
Intercept, reported recently that Canada’s leading surveillance 
agency is analyzing records of up to fifteen million downloads 
daily to track extremists.4  As a result, it seems likely that the 
Snowden leaks, already considered by many to be the most 
infamous example of whistleblowing of all time, will be a topic 
of American and global conversation for years to come.  
However, what is less clear is what kind of tangible 
legislative change (if any) the Snowden leaks will bring about, 
particularly in countries other than the U.S.  While much has 
been written about how the Snowden leaks have, and will 
continue to, influence American domestic policy and 
American diplomatic and intelligence-sharing arrangements 
with other nations, less has been written about the impact that 
the leaks have had on some of the U.S.’ most important allies.  
This paper analyzes what impact the Snowden leaks have had 
in Canada and the United Kingdom.  Sections one and two 
analyze the impact the Snowden disclosures have had on civil 
society.  In doing so, it notes a glaring lack of parliamentary 
mechanisms for oversight of intelligence activities in Canada 
and also illuminates issues with the existing mechanisms in 
the UK.  Section three examines what, if any, tangible 
legislative outcomes have resulted from the Snowden leaks. It 
concludes that it is difficult to assign any tangible legislative 
                                                 
2 Peter Bradshaw, Citizenfour Review – Gripping Snowden Documentary 
Offers Portrait of Power, Paranoia, and One Remarkable Man, THE 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/oct/16/citizen-four-
review-edward-snowden-documentary. 
3 James Bamford, Edward Snowden: The Untold Story, WIRED MAG., 
Aug. 22, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-
snowden/. 
4 Ryan Gallagher & Glenn Greenwald, Canada Casts Global 
Surveillance Dragnet Over File Downloads, THE INTERCEPT, Jan. 28, 
2015, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/28/canada-cse-
levitation-mass-surveillance/. 
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outcomes in either country to the leaks.  Finally, in the 
concluding section, recommendations for changes to the 
oversight mechanisms in both countries that may help to 
prevent the reoccurrence of some of the most egregious abuses 
exposed by the Snowden leaks are posited. 
 
I. CANADA – IMPACT OF SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES ON CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
 
 Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the Snowden 
disclosures there was a significant amount of material 
published by Canadian academics, legal associations, judges, 
standing committee members, Parliamentarians and the 
media.  This was to be expected as “Snowden’s revelations 
have implicated Canada’s foreign intelligence signals agency – 
the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) – in 
expansive domestic and foreign surveillance initiatives.”5 
Some of these expansive and troubling initiatives, which 
implicated both CSEC and other Canadian officials, include: 
CSEC using airport Wi-Fi to track Canadian travelers;6 CSEC 
setting up hidden spying posts in about twenty countries in 
which it conducted espionage at the behest of the NSA;7 
Canada allowing the NSA to spy on Canadian soil during the 
2010 G8 and G20 Summits;8 Canadian embassies overseas 
                                                 
5 Simon Davies, A Crisis of Accountability: A Global Analysis of the 
Impact of the Snowden Revelations, THE PRIVACY SURGEON 22 (2014), 
https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Snowden-
final-report-for-publication.pdf.  
6 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, CSEC Used 
Airport Wi-Fi to Track Canadian Travellers: Edward Snowden documents, 
CBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-
used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-
documents-1.2517881.       
7 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, Snowden 
Document Shows Canada Set Up Posts for NSA, CBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2013,  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/snowden-document-shows-
canada-set-up-spy-posts-for-nsa-1.2456886.  
8  Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, New Snowden 
Docs Show U.S. Spied During G20 in Toronto, CBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 
2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-
u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448. 
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using eavesdropping technology;9 and, finally, allegations that 
Canadian spies collected metadata of phone calls and e-mails 
to and from Brazil’s Mines and Energy Ministry.10  While these 
are only some examples of deeply worrisome Canadian 
complicity in NSA activity, they underscore one of the most 
significant areas of concern to be expressed by Canadian civil 
society: the deep inter-connection between Canada and the 
United States and the corresponding connection between their 
intelligence activities.  That Canada and the U.S. share deep 
economic, geographic, and cultural ties is no secret, but the 
extreme inter-connectedness of these two countries (and its 
impact on their intelligence-sharing relationships) begs further 
elucidation.  
 Farson and Teeple note that, “[t]he significance of the 
long-standing economic relationship with the U.S. may be 
even greater today for both parties, particularly given that 
other traditional political and military allies are now economic 
competitors.  Certainly, it has become ever more integrated 
with both countries remaining each other’s most significant 
trading partner.”11  Moreover, Farson and Teeple point to 
many other shared linkages between the countries that are 
crucial to their intelligence sharing relationships, namely, 
critical telecommunications and security infrastructure, and 
argue that Canada has been seen as a “freeloader” because of 
the imbalance between the two countries’ differing 
contributions to North American defence and security.12 
Canada, like the UK, is a member of the “Five Eyes” 
community that  
 
                                                 
9 Colin Freeze, Canadian Embassies Eavesdrop, Leak Says, THE GLOBE & 
MAIL, Oct. 29, 2013, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canada-involved-
in-us-spying-efforts-abroad-leaked-document-
says/article15133508/. 
10 Canadian Spies Targeted Brazil’s Mines Ministry: Report, CBC NEWS 
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadian-spies-targeted-
brazil-s-mines-ministry-report-1.1927975. 
11 Stuart Farson & Nancy Teeple, Increasing Canada’s Foreign 
Intelligence Capability: Is it a Dead Issue?, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L 
SECURITY, Vol. 30, 47, 59 (2015). 
12 Id. at 60. 
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pools their resources, divide targets according 
to geographic location and expertise, and share 
analyses. In all cases, the NSA is the big 
brother.  In some instances, it helps fund the 
activities of its partners in order to influence 
intelligence gathering programs. . . . Canada’s 
contribution focuses on the northern regions of 
Russia and China, Latin America, as well the 
northern parts of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans.13 
 
 Academic commentators have criticized various 
aspects of the intelligence sharing relationships between the 
two counties.  Clement has noted that,  
 
[w]ell before the Snowden revelations, CIRA 
commissioned an expert study of the Canadian 
Internet infrastructure, which compared all 
Canadian routings with those that transited the 
United States and found significant 
inefficiencies with the boomerang routing. 
CIRA’s report concluded that Canadian 
Internet access is heavily and unnecessarily 
dependent upon foreign infrastructure, 
especially US infrastructure.14  
 
He laments the fact that much of Canada’s internal Internet 
traffic is routed through the US, noting that the lack of 
international submarine fiber optic cables in Canada means 
that “almost all of Canada’s third country Internet traffic is 
similarly routed through the United States and via NSA 
surveillance operations.”15 While some Canadian Internet 
companies, such as Bell Canada, have seized upon this 
opportunity to offer “safer, more private, domestic” Internet 
                                                 
13 Id. at 63. 
14 Andrew Clement, Canada’s Bad Dream, WORLD POL’Y J., Vol. 31, 25-
33, 30 (2014), available at 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2014/canada's-bad-
dream. 
15  Id. at 27. 
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solutions,16 the post-Snowden climate in Canada still 
represents what Wesley Wark calls a “hopeful and distressing 
reality.”17 According to Wark, it is 
 
[h]opeful in the sense that we can anticipate a 
kind of recalibration of US-led global 
surveillance which might accord with our own 
principles and interests; distressing in that it 
reveals that Canada, enmeshed in its 
dependency on the NSA, and suffering 
problems of endemic secrecy, inadequate laws, 
poor accountability, hands-off political 
leadership, and an ill-informed public, cannot 
make independent headway in coming up with 
our own, applied Snowden verdict on global 
surveillance.18 
 
 Other than the issues noted above, there are several 
obstacles to the effective development and operation of a 
specifically Canadian system of intelligence oversight and 
accountability.  The first is cultural.  As Jeffrey Roy notes, 
 
[t]here is often a tendency in Canada to view 
such activity with a certain detachment and 
smugness: thank goodness that’s not us. Yet, 
almost every significant scandal involving 
government action in the US has been 
accompanied by revelations in Canada that 
public sector authorities are acting in a 
remarkably similar manner.19  
 
The second, more significant obstacle, is the lack of any 
established parliamentary review mechanisms that provide for 
                                                 
16  Id. at 27-28. 
17 Loch K. Johnson et. al, An INS Special Forum: Implications of the 
Snowden Leaks, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY, Vol. 29, 793-810 
(2014). 
18  Id. 
19 Jeffrey Roy, Secrecy, Security and Digital Literacy in an Era of Meta-
Data: Why the Canadian Westminster Model Falls Short, INTELLIGENCE & 
NAT’L SECURITY, 2-3 (2015). 
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any kind of meaningful oversight or accountability.  As will be 
discussed further below, attempts to set up a National Security 
Committee of Parliamentarians have been stymied for over a 
decade, despite support for such a Committee stemming from 
judicial inquiries, reports of parliamentary committees, civil 
society organizations and the wider legal community.  The 
result is the “absence of such oversight altogether, which is 
how one can reasonable characterize the Canadian model. 
With the partial exception of Ministers directing them, 
Canadian Parliamentarians are shielded from scrutinizing 
security authorities in any direct and meaningful manner.”20 
 In order to more fully understand Canada’s current 
lack of meaningful mechanisms for parliamentary review and 
accountability of intelligence service activities, several stymied 
attempts on behalf of Canadian civil society actors over the 
course of the last decade must be noted.  The first unsuccessful 
attempt to create a novel Parliamentary Committee on 
National Security (composed of both MPs and Senators from 
across party lines) occurred in 2005 under a Liberal minority 
government with the tabling of Bill C-81.21  Despite cross-party 
support, that bill died on the order paper following the 2005 
dissolution of the Canadian Parliament.  The continuing lack 
of effective parliamentary oversight was subsequently 
criticized by two separate, independent judicial reviews 
carried out by Justices O’Connor and Iacobucci pertaining to 
the actions of Canadian officials in the war on terror (in 
particular, CSIS and the RCMP).22  In particular, O’Connor 
noted that the rendition experienced by Maher Arar urgently 
emphasized that Canada was in need of an independent 
national security review framework.  A Standing Committee 
on Public Safety and National Security tasked with reviewing 
Iacobucci and O’Connor’s findings and recommendations 
would later in 2009 find it “regrettable that the government 
                                                 
20 Id. at 7. 
21 Full text, legislative history, and additional information pertaining 
to the bill available at http://openparliament.ca/bills/38-1/C-81/.   
22 Government of Canada Publications, Internal Inquiry into the 
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad 
Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/bcp-
pco/CP32-90-1-2010-eng.pdf.        
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has not yet established the independent national security 
review framework recommended by Justice O’Connor” and 
argue that said framework was “essential to prevent further 
human rights violations.”23  They forcefully added that “there 
was an urgent need for action” and that without an integrated 
structure for the full review of national security issues, 
Canadians would be at further risk of violations of their rights 
and freedoms.24 
 To this date, no mechanism for parliamentary 
oversight of intelligence or security mechanisms in Canada, 
along the lines of that proposed in Bill C-81 or envisioned by 
Justice O’Connor, exists.25  The ignorance of this alarming lack 
of oversight seems to be a trend continuing through successive 
Canadian governments that now continues under the current 
Conservative government’s administration.  For example, as 
noted by Roy,  
 
[a] report published by the federal Privacy 
Commissioner in early 2014, in line with much 
of the earlier analysis of the Canadian 
apparatus, calls for fundamental political 
reforms too ineffective or simply absent 
mechanisms for overseeing the data gathering 
activities of Canadian federal authorities as well 
as the public and private sectors more widely. 
                                                 
23 Ottawa Standing Committee on Public Safety and National 
Security, Review of the Findings and Recommendations Arising from the 
Iacobucci and O’Connor Inquiries, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId
=4004074. 
24 Id. at 11-17.  Recommendation five of this report states that, “[t]he 
Committee recommends, once again, that Bill C-81, introduced in the 
38th Parliament, An Act to Establish the National Security 
Committee of Parliamentarians, or a variation of it, be introduced in 
Parliament at the earliest opportunity.” 
25 Two Bills (S-220, infra note 32, and C-551, infra note 33) have been 
introduced in both the House and the Senate that continue the work 
of Bill C-81, although neither bill has made any kind of significant 
progress.  For example, Bill C-551 was introduced into the House in 
November of 2013 and has yet to progress, while Bill S-220 was 
introduced into the Senate in May 2014 and has still yet to pass 
Second Reading.  Id.  
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The report was widely applauded by Canadian 
security experts, though largely ignored by the 
Government itself.26  
 
It is within this context of ignorance that the concerns of 
Canadian civil society echo even louder. The Protect Our 
Privacy Coalition, which is made up of more than fifty civil 
society organisations, has launched an online initiative calling 
on Members of Parliament to introduce restrictions that would 
curtail CSEC’s most egregious abuses.27  Moreover, the British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association is constitutionally 
challenging aspects of CSEC’s legal and operational 
framework,28 and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association has 
also launched a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of 
PIPEDA, Canada’s federal data protection statute.29  
Moreover, the Privacy Commissioner has released a statement 
regarding telecommunications companies’ responses to 
information requests from government authorities, in which a 
number of recommendations are made, particularly in regards 
to the transparency of authorized disclosures.30  
 In addition to these civil society actors, a number of 
interested Members of Canadian Parliament have tried to 
push for additional debate pertaining to CSEC’s activities and 
Canada’s glaring lack of parliamentary overview of 
                                                 
26 Roy, supra note 19 at 17-18. 
27 See OPEN MEDIA, https://openmedia.ca/ourprivacy (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2015).   
28 The litigation is ongoing. See Globe Editorial, Hey CSEC, Stop 
Spying on Me, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 2, 2014, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/dont-
spy-on-me-csec/article17781948.   
29 The litigation is ongoing. See Alex Boutilier, Canadian Civil Liberties 
Group Launches Court Challenge on Warrantless Access, THE TORONTO 
STAR, May 21, 2014, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/05/21/canadian_civi
l_liberties_group_launches_court_challenge_on_warrantless_access.
html. 
30 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Statement from 
the Interim Privacy Commissioner of Canada Regarding 
Telecommunications Companies’ Responses to Information Requests from 
Government Authorities, https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-
c/2014/s-d_140430_e.asp. 
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intelligence activities.  In calling for an emergency debate on 
CSEC’s meta-data collection program, MP Charmaine Borg 
argued that, 
 
[a]n emergency debate is needed so that 
parliamentarians can take an in-depth look at 
the extent to which Canadians' personal 
information, metadata and other information 
are collected by the police, law enforcement 
agencies and national security agencies.  This 
debate is also needed so that we can look at 
measures that will lead to appropriate 
parliamentary oversight and ways to balance 
public and national security interests with 
Canadians' privacy rights.31   
 
Moreover, as aforementioned, interested members of 
Parliament have introduced two bills (S-22032 and C-55133) in 
order to further the work of C-81 and create a Parliamentary 
Committee for the oversight of national security and 
intelligence activities.  The current Canadian government’s 
response (or lack thereof) to the various efforts of academics 
and other civil society actors outlined in this section will be 
considered in this paper’s subsequent analysis of tangible 
legislative outcomes to result from the Snowden disclosures. 
 
 
 
II. UNITED KINGDOM – IMPACT OF SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES 
ON CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
                                                 
31 Charmaine Borg on Request for Emergency Debate, June 13, 2013, 
http://openparliament.ca/debates/2013/6/13/charmaine-borg-
1/only/.     
32 An Act to Establish the Intelligence and Security Committee of 
Parliament, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6556209&L
anguage=E&Mode=1 
33 National Security Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6256801&L
anguage=E&Mode=1.   
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 Whereas the Snowden disclosures in Canada and the 
United States sparked widespread civil society debate and 
condemnation, reaction to the disclosures in the United 
Kingdom has been markedly different, particularly in regards 
to the responses from the political classes.  As Martin Moore 
notes, 
 
[t]he reaction in the UK has to date been 
startlingly different.  The political class jointly 
defended the actions of the security services, 
and most shied away from proposing reform of 
the law. The press was split on their response, 
some recommending prosecution of the 
messenger, The Guardian. . . . It is difficult to 
explain why the reaction in the two countries 
has been so different.  No doubt partly it is 
cultural, and partly due to contrasting public 
attitudes in the UK and US to the role of the 
state. It must also be due in part to the UK’s 
intelligence services’ importance to its 
international status.  Intelligence remains one 
area where the UK is considered, in terms of 
expertise and performance, to be on a par with 
global superpowers.34  
 
As was the case with CSEC in Canada, the material disclosed 
by Snowden implicated the UK’s counterpart GCHQ 
(Government Communications Head Quarters) in various 
spying activities. Mark Young notes that, “British government 
concerns about the potential publication of classified data 
were significant enough to threaten The Guardian with legal 
action if the information was not destroyed.  The threats 
prompted the destruction of hard drives containing 
information related to GCHQ.”35 
                                                 
34 Martin Moore, RIP RIPA? Snowden, Surveillance, and the 
Inadequacies of our Existing Legal Framework, THE POL. Q., Vol. 85, No. 
2, 125-132, 125-126 (2014). 
35 Mark Young, National Insecurity: The Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of 
Classified Information, I/S: A J. OF LAW & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y, 
Vol. 10, 367, 368 (2014). 
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 The United Kingdom has been placed in a particularly 
precarious position by the Snowden disclosures because of its 
relationship with the European Union.  As was the case with 
Canada and the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
European Union share a vast inter-connectedness in several 
fields, including intelligence sharing and gathering.  For 
instance, Bauman notes that, “[t]he UK has been in an 
especially delicate position given that GCHQ has participated 
in aggressive behavior against other partners and EU 
institutions while being part of the European Union and 
having signed the EU treaty which requires member states’ 
loyalty.”36  Again, similar to what was the case in Canada and 
the United States, much of Europe’s Internet traffic is routed 
through the United Kingdom. As Brown and Korff note, the 
UK 
 
is the landing point for the majority of 
transatlantic fibre-optic cables.  GCHQ has 
reportedly placed data interceptors on fibre-
optic cables conveying internet data in and out 
of the UK, and are able to store a significant 
fraction of global Internet traffic for three days 
on a rolling basis while carrying out further 
automated analysis.37  
 
Despite Canada’s connections to the United States, and the 
UK’s connection to Europe, it is clear that the NSA and the 
GCHQ have invested more resources in their activities than 
any other organisations on earth.  As Bauman notes, 
 
[t]he NSA has a budget of US $10.8 bn (7.8 bn 
Euros) a year, whereas within Europe GCHQ’s 
budget of 1.2 bn Euros is well below the NSA, 
but nevertheless over twice the yearly budget of 
other agencies such as BND, FRA, or DGSE. 
This is why it may be more accurate to speak of 
                                                 
36 Zygmunet Bauman et. al, After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of 
Surveillance, INT’L POL. SOC., Vol. 8, 121-144, 127 (2014). 
37 Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in 
a Global Digital Environment, EUROPEAN HUM. RTS L. REV., Vol. 3, 243-
251, 243 (2014). 
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an Anglo-American guild of professionals 
extended to other Western intelligence services 
than to analyze the network as a US-European 
collaboration on an equal footing, or even a 
transatlantic collaboration correlated with 
NATO.38 
 
 Unlike Canada, the United Kingdom does have various 
mechanisms for oversight of national security and intelligence 
activities, which has led to a variety of pre and post-Snowden 
analyses and recommendations for change.  As Sudha Setty 
notes, 
 
[n]umerous parliamentary committees have 
undertaken investigations of the surveillance 
apparatus in the United Kingdom.  A broad 
investigation by the Constitution Committee 
led to findings in 2009 that the intelligence-
gathering services were largely compliant with 
the law, but that report included numerous 
recommendations for changes to surveillance 
authority and transparency, including giving 
greater consideration to civil liberties before 
implementing further surveillance programs, 
granting greater authority to various 
commissioners to exercise increased oversight, 
revisiting existing legislation to increase 
specificity in the surveillance authority, and 
making the work of the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal more transparent.39  
 
Writing in Martin Moore’s piece, Jenna Stratford, QC agrees 
that there are flaws with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 
namely that “[w]here complaints are rejected, as the huge 
majority unsurprisingly are, claimants are not given proper 
reasons but instead the judicial equivalent of a ‘neither 
confirm nor deny’ notice. In addition, at present there is no 
possibility of appeal from the Tribunal’s decisions, so that 
                                                 
38 Bauman, supra note 36. 
39 Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful 
Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT'L L. 69 (2015). 
COWARDLY TRAITOR OR HEROIC WHISTLEBLOWER?              104 
 
probably the only recourse is to Strasbourg.”40  Furthermore, 
the Intelligence and Security Committee considered whether 
GCHQ’s receipt of information by the NSA from the PRISM 
program was legal, ultimately finding that the GCHQ’s 
actions were compliant with the statutory framework, but 
concluding that the framework required additional 
specificity.41 
 A further complication arises in the United Kingdom 
because of the operation of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (RIPA).42  As Setty notes, under the operation of 
this act, 
 
[t]he sole recourse for challenging such actions 
under U.K. law is making a claim to the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal and that, 
although the Human Rights Act 1998 
incorporates the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) into U.K. domestic 
law, if the judiciary believes that a national 
security measure is incompatible with the 
ECHR standard, it may declare incompatibility 
but this does not constitute a mandate that the 
domestic security apparatus change its policies.  
As such, review at the domestic level has often 
been sharply curtailed.43  
 
RIPA has been criticized by many as an outdated piece of 
legislation that does not fit the current realities of our 
technologically advanced world.  Lord Ken Macdonald QC, 
who was the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and 
Wales from 2003-2008, argues that RIPA “was not written in 
the age of social media and big data. It is inherently 
                                                 
40 Moore, supra note 34. 
41 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Statement on 
GCHQ’s Alleged Interception of Communications under the US PRISM 
Programme, July 17, 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/225459/ISC-Statement-on-GCHQ.pdf. 
42 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents. 
43 Setty, supra note 39. 
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backwardlooking” and Jenna Straford echoes this sentiment 
by stating that, “RIPA contains only limited restrictions on the 
transfer of data to third-party powers. The Secretary of State 
has extremely wide discretion—almost unfettered in 
practice—to determine whether data may be transferred.”44 
 Despite the aforementioned varying responses by the 
media and political classes following the Snowden revelations, 
members of UK civil society have taken issue with the political 
responses of the UK Government in the post-Snowden era.  In 
the Institute for Public Policy Research’s Study Democracy in 
Britain, Lord Macdonald argues that revelations about the 
GCHQ’s Project Tempora 
 
point, perhaps, to an excessive and therefore 
damaging devotion to secrecy that appears to 
trump the right, even of parliament, to have a 
basic say in our security arrangements. The 
apparent manner of its conception and the 
government’s response to its being revealed is 
each troubling for the light it casts on questions 
of oversight and democratic accountability.45  
 
For Lord Macdonald, one of the most troubling aspects of 
what the Snowden disclosures revealed was that the GCHQ 
developed these capabilities while Government arguments to 
enact them in legislation were being successfully defeated in 
Parliament. As he notes, “[w]e are witnessing the creation of a 
very broad surveillance scheme by the backdoor – as 
successive governments have failed to persuade parliament 
that such schemes are justified or desirable – and a 
simultaneous growth in capacity and ambition on the part of 
GCHQ in the complete absence of debate, still less 
legislation.”46  Lord Macdonald refers to recent government 
attempts to suggest that Tempora is implicitly authorized by 
RIPA as “deeply unconvincing,” questioning how it was 
possible that, “[i]f Chris Huhne is to be believed, the cabinet 
                                                 
44 Moore, supra note 34. 
45 Guy Lodge & Glenn Gottfried (eds.), Democracy in Britain: Essays in 
Honour of James Cornford, INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (LONDON: UNITED 
KINGDOM) 173 (2014). 
46 Id. at 174. 
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and national security council did know [about Tempora].  
They were never told.”47 
 Similarly, the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee released a seething report pertaining to the current 
UK mechanisms for intelligence oversight,48 in which it 
criticized members of the British civil service – particularly the 
National Security Adviser and the head of MI5 – for refusing 
to give evidence.49  While the Committee did acknowledge 
that the Justice and Security Act50 made some changes to the 
Intelligence and Security Committee, it still concluded that, 
 
[w]e do not believe the current system of 
oversight is effective and we have concerns that 
the weak nature of that system has an impact 
upon the credibility of the agencies 
accountability, and to the credibility of 
Parliament itself.  Whilst we recognize the 
importance of limiting the access to documents 
of a confidential nature . . . engagement with 
elected representatives is not, in itself, a danger 
to national security and to continue to insist so 
is hyperbole.51  
 
It also levied several criticisms towards the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal and RIPA,52 and called it “unacceptable” that 
there was so much confusion around the work of the 
Intelligence Services Commissioner.53  In doing so, they made 
a number of recommendations that will be considered further 
in this paper’s subsequent (and concluding) section on 
recommendations for change.  
                                                 
47 Id. at 175. 
48 HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, COUNTER-
TERRORISM: SEVENTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2013-14, 66 [hereinafter 
Home Affairs Committee 17th Report], available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/c
mhaff/231/231.pdf. 
49 Id. 
50 Justice and Security Act 2013 c. 18, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents/enacted. 
51 Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48. 
52 Id. at 63-4, 70-71. 
53 Id. at 66. 
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III. CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM – THE IMPACT OF 
THE SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES ON TANGIBLE LEGISLATIVE 
OUTCOMES 
 
 Andrew Clement has argued that, “[h]ow Canada 
responds to the NSA-Snowden crisis will define its identity 
and shape its future for decades to come.”54  Unfortunately, if 
the early returns are a sign of things to come, Canada is not on 
its way to responding to the Snowden disclosures in any kind 
of comprehensive or definitive manner.  Granted, in the first 
section of this paper, several attempts were made by members 
of Canadian civil society to point to a glaring lack of 
parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities.  As noted in 
A Crisis of Accountability, a joint publication published in 
association with the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for 
Information Law and the Vrije Universiteit of Brussels, 
“[w]hile the net result has led to a greater understanding of 
CSEC’s activities and objectives, there has been minimal 
concrete movement towards reform aside from some early 
judicial proceedings.”55  It is still unknown at this point 
whether either of the aforementioned constitutional challenges 
launched by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
or the Canadian Civil Liberties Association will lead to fruitful 
reform.  Despite a very active civil society, responses from the 
current Conservative government have been sparse.  
Hopes for future tangible legislative outcomes are 
further called into question by the past track record of 
successive Canadian governments.  For over a decade now, 
various iterations of Bill C-81 (which would enact a National 
Security Committee of Parliamentarians to provide some form 
of parliamentary scrutiny of intelligence activities) have died 
in successive Canadian parliaments, despite cross-party 
support in 2005 at the time of the bill’s inception.  At that time, 
political instability associated with successive minority 
governments (and the corresponding dissolution of 
Parliament) could easily be assigned blame for the demise of 
Bill C-81. However, as Roy Notes, “[i]f partisan collaboration 
is rare and tenuous during minority regimes, it is quickly 
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COWARDLY TRAITOR OR HEROIC WHISTLEBLOWER?              108 
 
forgotten once majority status is returned since the victors see 
little compelling reasoning in sharing unfettered power with 
its now-defeated opponents.”56  The aforementioned current 
iterations of the bills (Bills S-220 and C-551) have been moving 
through Parliament at a snail’s pace, despite the impetus placed 
on them by the Snowden revelations.  Even before the 
Snowden revelations, two separate judicial inquiries by 
Justices Iacobucci and O’Connor (both of which attracted 
significant public attention) called attention to an alarming 
lack of parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities in 
Canada.  To date, the recommendations of these inquiries have 
still not been taken up by the Canadian government, despite 
the fact that the Standing Committee on Public Safety and 
National Security has reiterated their importance. While 
Canadians often enjoy debating the potential shortcomings of 
the US Congressional model, “other likeminded democracies 
have or are also forging more robust oversight and review 
mechanisms that are likely to prove increasingly consequential 
in balancing competing interests of security, secrecy and 
privacy in an environment of digital connectedness and 
information abundance.”57  Canada can ill-afford to stay 
stagnant in a world that continues to evolve and produce new 
digital realities. Nor can it afford to hope that its civil society 
or its courts will spur the Canadian government to action.  
To contrast, the issue in the UK is certainly not a lack of 
parliamentary oversight mechanisms of intelligence activities, 
but rather the appropriate means through which existing 
legislation and mechanisms should be refined.  For the most 
part, the UK Government has responded with silence and 
secrecy, even going so far as to attack The Guardian and force 
them to destroy material that would be damaging to the 
GCHQ. It has been noted that, “Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg has ordered an ’Obama-style’ review of intelligence 
agencies, to be led by the Royal United Services Institute, but 
the report will not even be released until after the May 2015 
elections.”58  As a result of this government response, Brown 
and Korff have argued that, “[i]t seems judicial intervention 
will be required to bring the UK’s legal framework back into 
                                                 
56 Roy, supra note 19 at 8. 
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compliance with the Human Rights Convention.”59  As noted 
above by Setty, even successful litigation may not bring about 
effective change because of the UK’s complex arrangements 
under RIPA, the European Convention for Human Rights and 
the Human Rights Act.  As a result, “[w]ithout a Snowden-like 
disclosure to enable such review, or a strong commitment by 
the United Kingdom to abide by the human rights standards 
articulated at the European level, parliamentary oversight 
would be the key mechanism to protect against overreaching 
by the British intelligence community.”60 
If parliamentary oversight is to be the key mechanism 
to protect against future overreaching of the British 
intelligence community, then the recommendations put 
forward by UK civil society members, in particular Lord 
Macdonald and the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, need to be taken seriously.  While some may 
argue that the 2013 Justice and Security Act attempted to do 
just that,61 others are more skeptical.  As Lord Macdonald 
notes, 
 
[t]he Justice and Security Act passed last year 
handed marginally more power to the ISC, but 
did little to correct executive control over it.  
For example, each committee member is now 
appointed by parliament but must first be 
nominated for membership by the prime 
minister.  The ISC now has the power to call for 
evidence or information from ministers and 
agencies; however, the means and manner in 
which information can be provided to the ISC 
must be outlined through a memorandum of 
understanding with the prime minister.  In the 
                                                 
59 Brown & Korff, supra note 37 at 6. 
60 Setty, supra note 39 at 28. 
61 Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48 at 62. “A 
number of witnesses to this inquiry took the opportunity to highlight 
the improvements to the Intelligence and Security Committee which 
were contained within the Justice and Security Act 2013.  There were 
suggestions that the committee ought not to be judged on its 
previous failures but rather time ought to be given to see how it 
worked under the new regime.” Id. 
COWARDLY TRAITOR OR HEROIC WHISTLEBLOWER?              110 
 
light of the Snowden revelations, it seems that 
reforms in the J&S Act did not go far enough.  
Moreover, we also need to consider the extent 
to which RIPA can be said to remain an 
adequate mechanism for regulating 
surveillance activities.62  
 
Even if one accepts the argument that the Justice and Security 
Act was an attempt to respond to deficiencies in the oversight 
of intelligence activities, this paper has noted the concerns of 
several academics and civil society actors pertaining to various 
other pieces of legislation and mechanisms, including RIPA 
and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, that have not been 
consequentially amended by that Act.  These still require 
further attention on the part of the UK Government before any 
true tangible legislative outcome can be assessed to the 
Snowden disclosures. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION – RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
CHANGE 
 
 Despite the apparent conclusion that neither the 
Canadian nor the UK government has responded to the 
Edward Snowden disclosures with tangible, consequential 
legislative changes, it cannot be said that these disclosures 
have had no impact.  The revelations provided for by the 
Snowden documents have fundamentally changed public 
perceptions in both countries about how intelligence activities 
are carried out and have sparked civil society commentary 
amongst academics, judges, legal practitioners, interest groups 
and the media pertaining to how oversight of intelligence 
communities should be improved in the future.  The immense 
energy and analysis that has gone into these various 
commentaries should not be lost.  As Wesley Wark argues, 
 
[w]hatever badge we stick to Mr. Snowden 
(and his media collaborators) may in itself not 
matter very much, and certainly will be 
dwarfed by the issue that he has called our 
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attention to.  That issue is the practice, and 
future, of global electronic surveillance by state 
intelligence agencies.  The ultimate verdict(s) 
regarding Edward Snowden the man will pale 
in significance alongside the verdict(s) on 
global surveillance.63  
 
With that in mind, this paper will now conclude by reiterating 
some of the most important changes that urgently need to be 
considered by both Canada and the UK going forward into a 
post-Snowden future.  
 For Canada, the most urgently needed change required 
is clear: the work of Bill C-81 needs to be fast-tracked through 
its current iterations, either Bill S-220 or C-551, so that the 
country may finally have some form of parliamentary review 
and oversight of intelligence activities.  The Canadian 
government should not need to be implored to do this through 
damaging revelations of sensitive material, which will 
undoubtedly continue in the future (as noted at the outset of 
this paper, a new Intercept story pertaining to CSEC’s spying 
was released only recently).  Various successive Canadian 
governments have for too long ignored a glaring deficiency in 
Canada’s overall national security apparatus.  Two separate 
judicial inquiries have been commissioned (at no small 
expense to the Canadian taxpayer) and both have 
recommended the immediate need for additional review 
mechanisms.  These recommendations have been further 
bolstered by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and 
National Security, and have been demanded by various civil 
society actors noted in this paper.  The Canadian government 
is poised to introduce a whole new set of anti-terrorism laws 
that it has been working on since last year’s attack on 
Parliament Hill.64  There is growing concern that this new 
package of laws will actually increase powers of various 
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intelligence and police agencies.65  These concerns are further 
exacerbated by the fact that Canada has no genuine 
accountability mechanisms for the oversight of these agencies, 
or for its national security apparatus as a whole.  It is simply 
irresponsible for the Canadian government to go forward with 
new counter-terrorism legislation without addressing this 
glaring gap in its current national security framework.  
 In contrast to Canada, the United Kingdom is 
significantly ahead in regards to existing infrastructure for 
parliamentary oversight and accountability of intelligence 
activities.  That being said, there are a number of targeted 
recommendations for change that could significantly improve 
these oversight mechanisms, were they to be acted upon by 
the UK government.  In particular, Lord Macdonald suggests 
six additional reforms: 1) The ISC should become a full joint 
parliamentary select committee; 2) it should be appointed by 
and responsible to both Houses of Parliament; 3) it should 
have stronger powers to obtain evidence.  These should 
include the power to obtain information, by summons, from 
outside parties, lay experts, ministers and civil servants, as 
well as from security chiefs; 4) it should have an independent 
secretariat and independent legal advice, and it should have 
access to all information.  Select committee procedures already 
allow the exclusion of material whose publication might be 
harmful and the disclosure of such material is a serious 
criminal offence; 5) it’s chair should be a member of the 
opposition and should not be someone who has previously 
held responsibility for any of the security agencies; 6) Finally, 
we need to increase the level of institutional expertise to 
ensure that human rights are put at the heart of policy and 
strategies in this area, at a level that is more than rhetorical.  
We need to consider how such a committee could develop a 
wider role in educating parliament as a whole and, 
consequently, the public.66 
 Similarly, the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee makes a number of recommendations that echo 
those of Lord Macdonald. They also believed that there were 
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several ways in which the ISC could be strengthened: 1) 
election of the membership of the Committee by the House of 
Commons; 2) the Chair of the Committee being a member of 
the Opposition and not a former Minister with responsibility 
for any of the agencies; 3) ensuring that the Committee has 
access to relevant expertise (for instance in terms of the 
technological aspect of the work carried out by the security 
and intelligence agencies); 4) allowing other Parliamentary 
Committees to scrutinize the work of the security and 
intelligence agencies.67  The Committee also recommended 
that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal be legislatively 
compelled to produce an annual report on their work, 
containing at the very least the number of cases it has received 
and the outcome of cases determined in that year.68  Finally, in 
regards to RIPA, the Committee argued that, 
 
[g]iven the criticism which the Regulation of 
the Investigatory Powers Act is subject to, we 
believe that the legislation is in need of review.  
We recommend that a Joint Committee of both 
Houses of Parliament should be appointed in 
order to hold an inquiry with the ability to take 
evidence on the Act with a view to updating it.  
This inquiry would aim to bring the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act up to date with 
modern technology, reduce the complexity (and 
associated difficulty in the use of) the 
legislation, strengthen the statistical and 
transparency requirements and improve the 
oversight functions as are set out in the current 
Act.69 
 
 Although both Canada and the UK have very different 
starting points for how they should oversee their intelligence 
activities in the future, the motive behind both is the same. 
Civil society confidence in the ability of both governments to 
protect the privacy of their citizens reached an all-time low 
following the Snowden disclosures. As is noted by Bauman, 
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[o]nly 5% of respondents in Canada trust 
government to guard their data, and this only 
rises to 7% in the United States. Whether in the 
United States, Canada, or the UK, it is clear 
from these results that a substantial proportion 
of the population are concerned about 
government surveillance and that there is a 
high degree of cynicism about what 
governments do with those data.70  
 
Members of civil society in both countries are doing what they 
can to compel their governments to act, but there is only so 
much they can do if their governments are unwilling.  Both 
Canada and the UK need to start treating the Snowden 
disclosures as an opportunity to reassess how they collect 
intelligence, when they collect intelligence, who they share 
intelligence with and, perhaps most importantly, how they 
oversee the collection of that intelligence.  
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